Israel's just-completed ground incursion in the Gaza Strip that began on March 1, 2008, should not have triggered much international debate. After all, for more than seven years Palestinian terrorist organizations have been intentionally firing rockets indiscriminately against Israeli civilian targets, especially at the Israeli town of Sderot which has absorbed roughly 45 percent of the nearly 3,000 attacks that have been launched.[1] As Israeli Minister of Public Security Avi Dichter noted on March 2, with the inclusion of the city of Ashkelon in the Palestinian target list, the number of Israeli civilians under rocket threat from Gaza has increased from 25,000 to 250,000.

With the inclusion of the city of Ashkelon in the Palestinian target list, the number of Israeli civilians under rocket threat from Gaza has increased from 25,000 to 250,000.

In complete contrast, Israeli military operations in Gaza in response to Palestinian rocket attacks have been directed at military targets, including rocket factories, rocket squads, and terrorist commanders. When Palestinian civilian casualties have occurred, they have been an unintended by-product of Israel's self-defense efforts. The fact that the Palestinian terrorist organizations often position their launch sites in urban areas and stockpile their weaponry in densely populated territory like the Jabaliya refugee camp in many cases makes them a party to the loss of Palestinian civilians ­- who serve, in effect, as human shields.[2] While it is often forgotten, Israel completely withdrew from the Gaza Strip in August 2005; it was clear from Israel's disengagement that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had absolutely no interest to operate in Gaza over the last number of years, unless Israel was attacked from Gaza territory. If Gaza rocket attacks on Israel did not occur, there would be no reason for the IDF to operate there.

Nonetheless, Israel very quickly became the subject of harsh international criticism. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon condemned Israel's "disproportionate and excessive use of force."[3] The EU presidency followed this language, referring to "the recent disproportionate use of force by the Israel Defense Forces against the Palestinian population in Gaza."[4] Western armies are engaged in asymmetric warfare against the Taliban in Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda in Iraq, yet no such statements are made with regard to these legitimate battles in the war on terrorism. To their credit, the U.S. and Britain rejected efforts to have the UN Security Council adopt a draft resolution further condemning Israel, but the discussions in New York demonstrated how UN member states had little idea of the magnitude of the rocket threat that Israel was facing and could also face in the future.

In order to best understand the main factors affecting the Palestinian rocket threat to Israel from Gaza, it is useful to examine the data in the accompanying maps and chart (see maps and chart below), based on data from the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, which uses the IDF General Staff Operations Division as its source. What emerges from this data are the following conclusions.

Rocket Fire Began and Grew When Fatah Controlled Gaza

The Kassam rocket threat started in 2001 and grew when the Palestinian Authority was under Fatah control. Hamas introduced the Kassam rocket for the first time in 2001, and there was a steady increase in Kassam rocket fire against Israel from 2002 through 2005. Even after the death of Yasser Arafat in November 2004, Kassam rocket fire from Gaza continued under the regime of Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen). True, Abbas called on Palestinians to stop firing rockets into Israel in 2006, but on the ground, he and the Fatah leadership were either unwilling or unable to halt the Hamas attacks as they increased - with only one exception. In August 2005, Kassam rocket attacks were dramatically reduced so that they would not get in the way of Israel's Gaza pullout.

Additionally, Fatah-affiliated groups in Gaza developed their own rocket systems: both the al-Aqsa rocket and the al-Yasser rocket. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades of Fatah in Gaza also fires rockets into Israel, and a Fatah squad in Tulkarm in the West Bank made two attempts to launch rockets at Israel.[5]

Palestinian Rocket Fire Jumps After Israel's Gaza Disengagement

Kassam rocket fire did not start with Israel's Gaza disengagement. Nonetheless, after disengagement the number of confirmed rocket strikes against Israel increased by more than 500 percent. During the year 2005, Israel absorbed 179 rocket strikes. Gaza disengagement was implemented in August 2005. The number of rocket strikes in the year 2006 shot up to 946 - a five-fold increase. What initially allowed the Palestinian organizations to develop their rocket capability with impunity was Israel's original withdrawal from most of the Gaza Strip in 1994 in accordance with the Gaza-Jericho Agreement under the Oslo Accord.

The 2005 Gaza disengagement provided Hamas with a sense of empowerment and self-confidence that led to a clear-cut escalation in the employment of the rocket capabilities that they had previously acquired. Politically, this led to the victory of Hamas in the Palestinian Authority parliamentary elections in January 2006. But militarily, Gaza disengagement also led to a dramatic increase in rocket attacks, as previously described.

Loss of Control Over Egypt-Gaza Border Led to Iranian Rockets on Ashkelon

The disengagement from Gaza led to the loss of Israeli control over the Philadelphi route between the Gaza Strip and Egyptian Sinai, allowing for a significant increase in the range and quantity of rockets in the Palestinian arsenal. What is dramatically new in the rocket attacks in 2008 are the range and quantity of rockets being fired. Ashkelon, a city of 120,000, was repeatedly struck by Katyusha (Grad) rockets in late February 2008. In 2007 and 2008, the Israeli city of Netivot was also a Palestinian target.

Prior to 2006, the number of Palestinian rocket attacks rarely reached 50 per month. By early 2008, Palestinian organizations displayed a capability of launching 50 rockets per day. Two events further contributed to the ease with which Hamas and other organizations could import materials and know-how for expanding their rocket forces: first, the Hamas military takeover in Gaza during June 2007, and second, the breaching of the Egyptian-Gaza border fence in January 2008.

As a result, the quantities of explosives and foreign-produced, longer-range rockets that could enter Gazan territory increased dramatically. Yuval Diskin, the head of the Israel Security Agency, told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee in early 2006 that the amount of explosives smuggled into the Gaza Strip from Egypt had grown drastically - by more than 300 percent.[6] True, the Palestinian organizations had used tunnels in past years to smuggle weaponry from Egyptian Sinai into Gaza. But clearly, once Hamas was fully in control in Gaza and the Egyptian border was regularly breached, the scale of this smuggling mushroomed.

According to Diskin, by November 2006, 33 tons of military grade explosives had been smuggled into the Gaza Strip since the 2005 disengagement. That number increased to 112 tons of explosives by October 2007.[7] Increasingly longer-range rockets came into Gaza freely as well.[8] Israeli security forces recently discovered in the western Negev the remains of a new 175 mm. rocket of Iranian origin that has a range of 26 kilometers.[9]

Should present trends continue, Israel will have to contend with yet another generation of rockets that could be deployed beyond the Katyushas that are hitting Ashkelon. Hamas spokesmen have already expressed their ambition of extending the range of their rockets to Ashdod, Israel's second major seaport for handling international cargo. Israeli security sources expect that Iran will try to smuggle its Fajr rockets to Gaza in the future. A 45-kilometer-range Fajr 3, for example, could be smuggled in sections and assembled in Gaza.[10]

The Failure of EU Monitors

In the aftermath of the Gaza disengagement, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice brokered the Rafah Crossing Agreement on November 15, 2005, to regulate the Gaza-Egyptian Border. The agreement provided for third-party monitors who were supplied by the European Union. The European monitors did not succeed in halting the flow of weapons or cash to the terrorist organizations. Moreover, as the security situation in the Gaza Strip deteriorated in 2006 and 2007, the EU monitors repeatedly withdrew from the border crossing area. In addition, Egypt has been completely unhelpful in the Rafah border area; Cairo even allowed Hamas operatives to leave Gaza in transit to Tehran, where they were trained by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) before returning to Gaza.

Two Key Areas of Concern

Israel currently faces many difficult choices in the face of continued Kassam and Katyusha rocket attacks on its cities, and Israel's security establishment will ultimately have to address two specific areas:

  • The Philadelphi Route - As long as the Philadelphi route along the Gaza-Egypt border is open for Hamas smuggling, the risk to Israel will grow, as Iran exports rockets of increasing range to the Gaza Strip. The port of Ashdod is the next likely target, but should Fajr rockets reach Gaza, there is no reason why Hamas cannot pose a threat to Tel Aviv.
  • The Northern Gaza Launch Sites - The short-range Kassam rockets used by the Palestinians are locally produced and, therefore, cannot be halted by efforts to close the Philadelphi route. However, control of the launch areas in northern Gaza could significantly reduce the ability of Hamas to harass Sderot and the communities of the western Negev with rocket and mortar fire.

The repeated lesson of the last seven years is that only Israel can ultimately be responsible for its own security.

The repeated lesson of the last seven years is that only Israel can ultimately be responsible for its own security. The use of European Union monitors in the Rafah crossing area did not work out; nor will other international monitors provide security in the future in such a dangerous area. Egypt understands that a Muslim Brotherhood regime in Gaza endangers its own security, but there are limits to what Egypt can realistically do to confront Hamas, without alienating Egyptian domestic opinion. Furthermore, even when the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority was in control of Gaza, it never fully halted the Hamas rocket attacks that emanated from territories under its jurisdiction.

Israel's war against Hamas is hardly over. As Hamas attacks continue, Israel will have to take further measures to suppress Hamas rocket fire. Presently, the Hamas leadership understands that repeated Katyusha attacks against Ashkelon will result in an Israeli ground incursion that can cost them nearly one hundred of their personnel. But without addressing the Philadelphi route or the northern Gaza launch sites, it is doubtful that these kinds of deterrence calculations alone will bring the Hamas rockets to a halt and alleviate the misery of the Israeli residents of Sderot.

In parallel to its military response, however, Israel will need to wage a strong diplomatic effort to safeguard its right of self-defense, which many in the international community seek to erode. Even in this latest round of conflict, as Israel sought to defend itself from Palestinian rocket attacks, it has already faced harsh criticism, which will only foster new international pressures when struggle with Hamas is resumed.

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1. Rocket Threat from the Gaza Strip, 2000-2007, Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage & Commemoration Center (IICC), December 2007, p. 70.

2.Ibid., p. 64.

3. Anne Penketu, "U.S. and Arab States Clash at UN Security Council," The Independent (UK), March 3, 2008.

4. "U.S. Calls for End to Violence; Arab World Protests Gaza Deaths," Ha'aretz, March 3, 2008,

5. Rocket Threat from the Gaza Strip, 2000-2007, p. 69.

6. Yaakov Katz, "3,000 Weapons Streaming Monthly into Gaza," Jerusalem Post, January 2, 2006.

7. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Threat to Israeli Civilians from the Gaza Strip," November 21, 2006,

8. Yaaakov Katz, "Hamas Building Bunkers Near Boarder," , October 29, 2007,

9. Alex Fishman and Aryeh Algozi, "The Concern: The Range Will Continue to Grow,"Yediot Ahronot (Hebrew), March 3, 2008.

10. Ibid

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Palestinian Launching Sites in the Northern Gaza Strip and the Role of the Philadelphia Route Along the Egyptian Border

The Increasing Range of Palestinian High-Trajectory Fire Against Israeli Cities and Towns

The Sharp Increase in the Palestinian Rocket Attacks: 2000-2008